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The Elephantine Google Books Settlement
THE ELEPHANTINE GOOGLE BOOKS SETTLEMENT
by JAMEs GRIMMELMANN*
"[T]his case is a class action prompted by the elephantine mass of
asbestos cases ....
"It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind)" 2
INTRODUCTION
The genius - some would say the evil genius - of the proposed
Google Books settlement3 was the way it fused legal categories. In its
opinion rejecting the settlement,4 the district court discussed class action,5
copyright,6 and antitrust issues,7 among others. But just as an elephant is
not merely a trunk plus legs plus a tail, the settlement is more than the
sum of the individual issues it raises. The numerous "issues" described by
commentators8 and the court are really just different ways of describing a
single, overriding issue of law and policy - a new way to concentrate an
intellectual property industry. I propose to describe the elephant.
This essay will argue for the critical importance of seeing the settle-
ment all at once, rather than as a list of independent legal issues. After a
*Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
2 John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE OXFORD ILLUS-
TRATED BOOK OF AMERICAN CHILDREN'S POEMs 24 (Donald Hall ed.
2001).
3 Amended Settlement Agreement [hereinafter ASA], Authors Guild, Inc. v.
Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-DC (S.D.N.Y filed Nov. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view-settlement-agreement.
4 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS
29126 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011).
5 Id. at 14-30.
6 Id. at 30-36, 40-45.
7 Id. at 36-38.
8 Including an actual group of blind men and women. See Comments of Disabil-
ity Organizations of or for Print-Disabled Persons in Support of the Pro-
posed Settlement, Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(arguing in favor of the settlement because of its provisions for access by
the print-disabled). They were among the most perceptive commentators
on the settlement; they fully appreciated its remarkable implications for ac-
cess to books.
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brief overview of the settlement and its history (Part I), it will describe
some of the more significant issues raised by objectors to the settlement
and discussed in the court's opinion, focusing on the trio of class action,
copyright, and antitrust law (Part II). The purpose of this Part is not to
criticize or defend the court's reasoning, but rather to show that the hunt
to characterize the settlement has ranged far and wide across the legal
landscape.
Truly pinning down the settlement, however, will require tracing the
connections between these different legal areas. The essay will argue
(Part III) that the central truth of the settlement was that it used an opt-
out class action to bind copyright owners (including the owners of orphan
works) to future uses of their books by a single defendant. This statement
fuses class action, copyright, and antitrust concerns, as well as a few others.
It shows that the settlement would have been, at heart, a vast concentra-
tion of power in Google's hands, for good or for ill. The settlement was a
classcopytrustliphant, and we must strive to see it all at once, in its en-
tirety, in all its majestic and terrifying glory.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part will provide the minimal necessary overview of the now-
rejected settlement's history and terms.9 The settlement is large, compli-
cated, and full of rabbit holes, any one of which could make for a full
article in its own right. Therefore, this Part will discuss only those settle-
ment provisions that are essential to the discussion that follows. The
reader interested in a fuller account should consult Jonathan Band's au-
thoritative The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement.'o
A. The Lawsuit
In 2004, Google announced partnerships with major academic librar-
ies to digitize the books in their collections. Google's employees, using
specially designed machines, would take a photograph of each page in a
book; Google computers would then analyze the images to recognize the
words on that page. The goal was to create a searchable index of books,
akin to Google's searchable index of web pages.
At first, the project included only books in the public domain, but it
soon expanded to include books under copyright as well. Although
9 See The Public Index, http://thepublicindex.org (collecting documents related
to the settlement) (last visited July 12, 2011).
10 Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement,
9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227 (2009); see also JONATHAN
BAND, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED PART IV (2011), available at http://
www.arl.org/bm-doc/guideiv-final-1.pdf (updating discussion from The
Long and Winding Road to reflect the settlement's rejection).
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Google lets viewers view and download full PDF versions of the public-
domain books, it displays only "snippets" from books under copyright -
short sections of text around the term the user searched for. If the copy-
right owner agrees, Google will show more of the book; if the copyright
owner objects, Google turns off even the snippets.
After some jousting in the public arena, copyright owners sued
Google in late 2005. Three named authors and the Authors Guild, a pro-
fessional association representing about 8,000 United States authors, were
the first, giving the case the caption Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
Five major publishers followed with their own suit shortly thereafter."
Importantly, the Authors Guild structured its lawsuit as a class action (on
behalf of all copyright owners whose books were held by the University of
Michigan library, Google's first library partner).
The lawsuits attracted substantial public attention when filed,12 but
dropped off the radar during discovery. In 2006, however, after being
prompted by the court to discuss settlement, the parties quickly hit on the
general outlines of a deal that they could all agree to. The details of this
"groundbreaking" settlement were complicated enough that it took an-
other two years to hammer them all out. On October 28, 2008, the parties
announced a proposed settlement and filed it with the court. 13
B. The Settlement's Terms
Many observers had thought that Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
would turn on whether Google could establish a fair use defense for its
scanning, indexing, and snippet display.14 The proposed settlement al-
lowed both sides to claim victory on these issues. On the one hand,
Google would have been allowed to continue scanning and indexing on
much the same terms as before: the only significant use it agreed to give
11 See McGraw Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 08881 (S.D.N.Y. complaint
filed Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/complaint/
publishers.pdf.
12 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Googling Literature: The Debate Goes Public, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 19, 2005, at B7 (describing "face[ ] off" between copyright
owners and Google in debate held at New York Public Library).
13 See Notice of Motion for Preliminary Settlement Approval, Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 28, 2008), available
at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/motions/approval/motion.pdf.
14 For academic views on the fair use issue, see Band, supra note 10, at 236-60; see
also Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as Information Policy: Google Book
Search from a Law and Economic Perspective, in 9 INNOVATION POL'Y &
THE ECONoMY 55-77 (Josh Lerner et al. eds., 2008); Matthew Sag, The
Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L ScH. L.
REV. 19 (2010); Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes
for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87 (2006).
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up was snippet display for in-print books.15 On the other hand, Google
would have paid for its past scans: $60 for each book scanned before May
5, 2009.16
This much was relatively unsurprising. The more interesting - and
controversial - parts of the settlement were the "Revenue Models" it
authorized Google to offer to the public. The details are immensely com-
plicated, and the version here is enormously simplified, but for present
purposes, there were three Revenue Models of note:
Consumer Purchase: Google would have sold individual online e-
books to users. For example, a reader might have paid $7.99 to
obtain perpetual access to a version of Randall Stross's Planet
Google stored on Google's servers.17
Institutional Subscription: Google also would have sold all-you-
can-eat access to its entire catalog of books. A library or univer-
sity could have bought a year's worth of access to every book in
Google's collection by all of its members or students.' 8 Presuma-
bly, this year's worth of access would have cost rather more than
$7.99.
Preview Use: Google would have shown up to 20% of the pages
of a book for free to Web users, while showing paid ads alongside
the pages.19
All three of these uses would have generated revenue. Google would
have kept 37% and passed 63% along to copyright owners, to be split
between authors and publishers. 20 A new institution, to be called the Book
Rights Registry, would actually have administered the handling of the
money.21 The Registry would have cut checks to copyright owners who
claimed their books, and held the money in escrow for owners who had
not. 22
Copyright owners would have retained substantial ongoing control
over these uses. They would have had a year and a half to tell Google not
to scan their book at all; if Google had already scanned the book, it would
delete the files. 2 3 At any point, a copyright owner could have moved her
15 ASA, supra note 3 §§ 3.1(a), 3.4.
16 Id. § 5.1(a).
17 Id. §4.2.
18 Id. § 4.1
19 Id. § 4.3.
20 Id. § 4.5(a) (requiring Google to pay 70% of its revenues to copyright owners);
§ 1.86-87 (allowing Google to reduce the amount it pays copyright owners
by 10% to pay its "operating costs"). After ten years, unclaimed funds
would have been given to charity instead. See id. § 6.3(a)(i)(3).
21 Id. § 6.1.
22 Id. § 6.3.
23 Id. § 3.5(a).
500 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
The Elephantine Google Books Settlement
book in or out of these various uses - deciding, for example, to start
selling it, or to allow Preview access only.24 In Consumer Purchase an
owner could have chosen a price or delegated the pricing decision to
Google.2 5 The Registry would also have been responsible for negotiating
with Google on the terms of possible new uses like print-on-demand and
PDF download.2 6
The settlement's defaults were also extremely important. Google
would have promised not to display or sell in-print books unless and until
the copyright owner individually authorized it to.27 For out-of-print
books, the default was exactly the opposite: Google would have sold cop-
ies through Consumer Purchase, included them in the Institutional Sub-
scription, and allowed Previews. 2 8 The copyright owner of an out-of-print
book could have told Google to turn off these uses, but by default they
would have started on.
C. Where Are We Now?
The core terms of the settlement, described in the previous Section,
remained substantially unchanged between the time the settlement was
filed in October 200829 and the time the court rejected it in March 2011.30
The two and a half years in between were hardly uneventful. Because the
proposed settlement was a class-action settlement, its approval required
notice to the class, an opt-out and objection period, and a fairness hear-
ing.31 After District Judge John Sprizzo, who had been hearing the case,
signed the scheduling order, he passed away in December 2008.32 The
case was reassigned to District Judge Denny Chin.33 The class-action no-
24 Id. § 3.2(e)(i).
25 Id. § 4.2(b).
26 Id. § 4.7.
27 Id. § 3.2(b).
28 Id.
29 Notice of Motion for Preliminary Settlement Approval, Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-JES, (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 28, 2008), available
at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/motions/approvallmotion.pdf.
30 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS
29126 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
32 Bruce Weber, Judge Sprizzo, 73, U.S. Judge, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008,
at B12.
33 Notice of Reassignment, Authors Guild,. No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 1,
2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2005cv08136/273913/70. During the pendency of the case,
Judge Chin was nominated for, confirmed to, and seated on the Second
Circuit. He continues to sit by designation in the district court, presiding
over Authors Guild and other cases.
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tice program began in January 2009, with an opt-out/objection deadline in
May and a fairness hearing in June.34
After a relatively quiet winter and early spring, controversy around
the settlement began to heat up as the May deadline approached. A group
of authors led by John Steinbeck's literary estate was granted a four-
month delay, pushing the opt-out/objection deadline back to September 4
and the fairness hearing to October 7.35 This revised filing deadline more
or less held, with hundreds of objections and letters supporting and oppos-
ing the settlement pouring in during late August and early September. 36
The most influential filing was a Statement of Interest offered by the
United States on September 18.37 It praised some aspects of the settle-
ment, but expressed substantial skepticism about the settlement's class-
action bona fides and antitrust implications. 38 In response, the parties to
the settlement withdrew it,39 promising to offer a revised version forth-
with.40 "Settlement 2.0" arrived on November 13, just before midnight;4 1
the accelerated re-notice schedule provided for objections and fresh opt-
34 Order Granting Preliminary Settlement Approval, Authors Guild, No. 05-CV-
8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 17, 2008), available at, http://thepublicindex.
org/docs/motions/approvallorder-granting-preliminary-approval.pdf.
35 Letter from Andrew C. Devore to J. Chin (Apr. 24, 2009), available at http://
thepublicindex.org/docs/motions/approval/devore.pdf (proposed extension
dates); Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 24, 2009),
available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/motions/approval/order allowing
extension.pdf (order granting extension).
36 See The Public Index, Responses to the Settlement, http://thepublicindex.org/
documents/responses (last visited July 12, 2011).
37 Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Class Settlement, [hereinafter Statement of Interest] Authors Guild, No. 5
CV 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://thepublic
index.org/docsletters/usa.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Notice of Unopposed Motion to Adjourn Oct. 7, 2009 Final Fairness Hearing
and Schedule Status Conference, Authors Guild, No. 5 CV 8136 (DC)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/
motions/hearing/adjourn motion.pdf; Order Granting Unopposed Motion
to Adjourn Oct. 7, 2009 Final Fairness Hearing and Denying Adjournment
of Schedule Status Conference, Authors Guild, No. 5 CV 8136-DC
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/
caseorder/20090924.pdf.
40 Transcript of Oct. 7, 2009 Schedule Status Conference, Authors Guild, No. 5
CV 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2009) available at http://thepublicindex.
org/docs/case-order/Status%20Conference%20Transcript.pdf.
41 Notice of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agree-
ment, Authors Guild, No. 5 CV 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), availa-
ble at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:
2005cv08136/273913/768/.
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outs to be filed by January 28, 2010, with a fairness hearing on February
18.42
The most significant change from Settlement 1.0 to Settlement 2.0 was
a narrowing of the settlement's geographic scope. Settlement 1.0 applied
to all books that were the subject of a United States copyright interest -
essentially, any book published anywhere in the world that Google man-
aged to find a copy of and scan in the United States.43 Settlement 2.0
applied only to books registered with the United States Copyright Office
or published in the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia.44 Settlement
2.0 also created an Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to monitor the handling of
unclaimed funds and to take a few ministerial actions on behalf of owners
who didn't claim their books.4 5
The filings this time were fewer in number - a few dozen fully
briefed objections and a slightly larger number of less formal letters -but
no less contentious.46 The parties replied in a trio of memoranda that ran
to some 350 pages, supported by thousands of pages of supporting affida-
vits.47 The fairness hearing featured some twenty-six objectors and amici,
plus responses from the parties, and a strong statement from the Depart-
ment of Justice - now firmly in the "opposed" camp.4 8 At the close of
the hearing, Judge Chin took the case under advisement, offering no hint
as to when he would rule.4 9
In the end, it took a little over a year. The court's forty-eight page
opinion, issued on March 22, 2011, was a broad rejection of the settle-
ment.50 Although it left the door open for a narrower revised settle-
42 Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement,
Authors Guild, No. 5 CV 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended-settlement/order-granting-prelim-
approval.pdf.
43 Declaration of Michael J. Boni in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Settlement Approval, Exhibit 1 § 1.16, at 3, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ.
8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://thepublicindex.
org/docs/amended settlement/Boni declaration.pdf.
44 ASA, supra note 3, § 1.19.
45 Id. § 6.2(b)(iii).
46 See The Public Index: The Amended Settlement and Responses, http://the
publicindex.org/documents/amendedsettlement (last visited July 12, 2011).
47 See id.
48 Transcript of Fairness Hearing, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
18, 2010), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/caseorder/fairness-
hearing-transcript.pdf.
49 Id. at 166.
50 Authors Guild, No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 29126 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2011).
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ment,5 1 the opinion left little doubt that the court was deeply "troubled"
by numerous basic features of the one before it. 52
II. CLASS ACTION, COPYRIGHT, ANTITRUST
The description above barely scratches the surface of a large and very
complicated settlement. But it should be enough to give a sense of the
multifarious legal issues the proposed Authors Guild settlement raised.
This Part will sketch a few of the more prominent ones, with emphasis on
the Big Three: class action, copyright, and antitrust. The question to keep
in mind will be: Do these legal questions get at what is truly remarkable
about this settlement?
A. Class Action
Although they are interesting and controversial,5 3 we should leave
aside the purely "procedural" class action issues, such as whether the class
members were given adequate notice of the settlement, as required by
Rule 23.54 The district court thought they were,5 5 and even if they
weren't, these sorts of defects are fixable. The parties could spend more
money on better translations, wider mailings, and a more usable settle-
ment website.
Similarly, we can pass quickly over the strenuous objections to partic-
ular economic provisions of the settlement, such as Google's 37% share of
the money and the relative split of revenues between publishers and au-
thors.5 6 Even if the objectors were right that Settlement 2.0 was finan-
cially unfair to some or all copyright owners,57 it is possible to imagine a
Settlement 3.0 that gets the numbers right. Additionally, the settlement
was replete with opportunities for copyright owners to remove their books
51 Id. at 45-46.
52 Id. at 21.
53 See, e.g., Objections of Harrassowitz, Media24, Studentlitteratur AB, Nor-
stedts Forlagsgrupp AB, Norstedts Kartor AB, & Leopard Forlag AB to
Proposed Settlement & Brief of Amici Curiae Borsenverein des Deutschen
Buchhandels et al., Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136-DC (ECF) (S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Harrassowitz Objections], available at
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/objections/harrassowitz.pdf.
54 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
55 Authors Guild, No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 29126 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2011), at *19-20.
56 See ASA, supra note 3, § 4.5(a).
57 See, e.g., Objections of Arlo Guthrie, Julia Wright, Catherine Ryan Hyde, &
Eugene Linden to Proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement, Authors
Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://
thepublicindex.org/docs/objections/guthrie.pdf.
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from the various revenue models at any point.5 8 They would still have
been bound by the settlement's terms,5 9 so this option is something less
than a true opt-out from the class action. Still, these "internal opt-outs"
would have given copyright owners the ability to withdraw from many of
the settlement's commercial programs, should they have proved unfair.
The more interesting and most fundamental class-action issues go to
the question of future claims. The prototypical damages class action
(under Rule 23(b)(3)) gives class members a cash payout in exchange for
their release of claims against the defendant. Imagine a check for $50,
intended to cover the average cost to repair a defective gas grill. The Au-
thors Guild settlement, however, would have required plaintiff class mem-
bers to give up not only their past claims against Google for the books it
had scanned, but also their future claims against Google for all the uses it
would have made of those scans when it sold copies of them.6o
In a damages class action, the only thing class members have at stake
is their claim for damages. Even if their lawsuit is mismanaged or compro-
mised too cheaply, nothing worse will happen to them. Their harms are
over and done with; the lawsuit is only a dispute about compensation.
When future claims are on the table, though, class members face the risk
that a bad settlement could expose them to future harms as well.
At first glance, the settlement appears to run afoul of Supreme Court
precedents, established in asbestos cases, expressing grave skepticism
about future claims.61 But the issue is hardly clear-cut. Courts have some-
times entered class-action settlements that require plaintiffs to release fu-
ture claims against the defendant. 62 The parties here pointed to
settlements in trespass 63 and nuisance 64 cases in which the plaintiffs were
ultimately compensated for transferring an easement to the defendant. A
58 ASA, supra note 3, § 3.5.
59 Id. § 10.2.
60 Id.
61 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
62 See Brief of Google Inc. in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended
Settlement Agreement at 8-14, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Google Brief in Support], availa-
ble at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended-settlement/google-final-ap
proval support.pdf; Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Responding to
Specific Objections at 45-51, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amend
edsettlement/Supplemental memorandumof_1aw.pdf.
63 Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecommc'ns., Inc., 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir.
2002).
64 Alvarado v. Memphis-Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., Nos. 99-5159, 99-5162, 2000
WL 1182446 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2000).
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challenge to the Authors Guild settlement on future-claims grounds, then,
must either repudiate these cases or distinguish them.
Perhaps remarkably, the court's opinion does neither. The Second
Circuit deals with future-claims questions in class actions by allowing the
release of claims not part of the original lawsuit only if they and the claims
sued on are based on an "identical factual predicate." 65 Here, the settle-
ment's opponents claimed that the "factual predicate" to the lawsuit was
Google's scanning and display of snippets, not the sale of whole books.66
The settlement's proponents countered that the "factual predicate" was
Google's infringement in making digital uses of complete books, basically
the same thing as the settlement would have allowed.67 The court ac-
cepted the objectors' characterization, but without any detailed discussion
of the cases the parties cited as precedent.6 8
This is an important, subtle question, with enormous implications for
the future class actions. But it is subtle - surely there is something more
going on with this settlement than the exact language of the original com-
plaints. The court's opinion seems to share this intuition (albeit without
explaining it). The subtext is that the Rule 23 issues in the settlement were
so readily apparent that one need not resort to a careful reading of
caselaw. That may be, but if so, the reason cannot be found entirely within
class-action law.
B. Copyright
We see the same pattern repeated when we look at the copyright is-
sues. The most widely repeated copyright objection was that the settle-
ment would have impermissibly imposed an "opt-out" system on copyright
owners. The Constitution,69 the Copyright Act,70 and international copy-
right treaties7 ' all emphasize the "exclusive" rights of authors. Once an
65 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir.
2005).
66 See, e.g., Objections of Microsoft Corp. to Proposed Amended Settlement &
Certification of Proposed Settlement Class & Sub-class at 13-15, Authors
Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 28, 2010) [hereinafter
Microsoft Objections], available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended-
settlement/MicrosoftObjection.pdf.
67 Google Brief in Support, supra note 62, at 24-28.
68 Authors Guild, No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 29126 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2011), at *24-27
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
71 See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 9, Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention] available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ip/berne/trtdoeswo001.html.
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author has created a copyrightable work, she alone can authorize its use -
or refuse permission.72 In this sense, copyright is an "opt-in" regime.
Unless the author affirmatively opts in to allow a use, no one else is al-
lowed to engage in it.
The settlement, however, would have imposed an "opt-out" system
on copyright owners. This is most apparent for out-of-print books. There,
unless a copyright owner objected, Google would have been allowed to
sell complete copies of the book both to individuals and as part of its sub-
scription service.7 3 The copyright owner could have objected at any time,
but unless and until she did, Google would have been allowed to engage in
these uses. That is an opt-out rule, not an opt-in. In the words of no less
than the Register of Copyrights herself, the settlement would thus have
"flip[ped] copyright on its head." 74
Matters in the courtroom were not quite so black-and-white, how-
ever. Even though it was offered doctrinal theories it could have used to
hold that "opt-in only" was a binding rule of copyright law, the court twice
ducked the question:
In any event, I need not decide the precise question of whether the ASA
would in fact violate § 201(e); the notion that a court-approved settle-
ment agreement can release the copyright interests of individual rights
owners who have not voluntarily consented to transfer is a troubling
one ... .75
Many foreign objectors express concern as to whether the ASA would
violate international law, including the Berne Convention and the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. . . . In
any event, I need not decide whether the ASA would violate interna-
tional law. In light of all the circumstances, it is significant that foreign
authors, publishers, and, indeed, nations would raise the issue.76
The court's hesitation was understandable. There are precedents for
exceptions to an "opt-in only" principle. United States law authorizes cer-
tain nonprofit public performances unless the copyright owner opts out by
serving a notice of objection.77 Many national collecting societies re-
72 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2008) (vesting initial ownership of copyright in a work's
author).
73 See supra text accompanying note 28.
74 Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 64 (2009) (testimony of Marybeth Peters, Regis-
ter of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
75 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS
29126 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011), at *32.
76 Id. at 42-43.
77 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2006).
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present copyright owners on an opt-out basis.78 International copyright
law recognizes an entire category of "exceptions and limitations" to exclu-
sive rights. 79
"Opt-in only" might be better described as a general principle that is
operationalized in the texts of specific legislation and treaties. Those spe-
cific instantiations of the principle, however, come with their own defini-
tions and qualifications. Once you start arguing about these details, you
have arguably left the realm of really fundamental analysis. Should how
we think about the Authors Guild settlement depend on the exact way that
the Berne Convention uses the term "formality"80 or on the legislative
history of Section 201(e) of the Copyright Act?81 The court's opinion thus
again shares the sense that there is something important to the settlement
that cannot entirely be captured by a close reading of the caselaw.
The second-most prominent copyright issue raised by the settlement
concerns so-called "orphan works." 82 Many works are under copyright
but have owners who cannot be found. Would-be users, in turn, cannot
find an owner to ask permission for their uses, leaving the works to lan-
guish, unused. The absentee owners lose, too, since their works are yield-
ing neither royalties nor exposure. This is a known problem in copyright
law, going well beyond just books.83
The settlement would have made orphan books - which are, almost
by definition, currently out of print - available again. Since the owner
cannot be found, she would also have been unlikely to pull the "opt-out"
lever on her book in the settlement. The result would have been that
Google would sell full copies of it online. These books thus would have
gone from being mostly unavailable to being widely available. What is
more, the owner would have been accruing revenues from these sales.
When she showed up to claim her book, she would also have received a
78 See Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nor-
dic Experience - It's a Hybrid but Is It a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTs 471 (2010).
79 See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 71, art. 9.2.
80 Berne Convention, supra note 71, art. 5.2, at 6; cf Harrassowitz Objections,
supra note 53, at 17-21.
81 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006); cf Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Set-
tlement at 32-34, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136-DC
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept 1, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/
letters/amazon.pdf.
82 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge in Opposition to the Pro-
posed Settlement, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 8,
2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/pk.pdf.
83 COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKs 55 (2006), available at http:/
/www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
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check for her share of the money - giving her an incentive to come
forward.
So far, then, the orphan works point sounds like an argument for the
settlement, rather than the basis of an objection to it.M To the extent that
there is an "orphan works objection" purely within copyright law, it would
go something like this: The orphan works problem is so big and so far-
reaching that it is inherently legislative. Solving it will require balancing
the interests of authors, publishers, libraries, readers, and others; that kind
of political compromise is a job for Congress. In the court's words:
The questions of who should be entrusted with guardianship over orphan
books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters more ap-
propriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among pri-
vate, self-interested parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "it
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the
Copyright Clause's objectives."85
This is an important policy point about institutions and copyright law,
but it is not exactly a legal argument against the settlement.8 6 The Copy-
right Act nowhere mentions "orphan works"; a court must apply existing
law to decide the case before it.87 "Don't step on Congress's toes," is at
most a prudential argument - one that could hardly prevail over Con-
84 Google in particular made this point heavily. See Google Brief in Support,
supra note 49, at 1-2, 66-67. It also recruited nonprofit and academic allies
who admired this aspect of the settlement. Letter from Gregory Crane, Ed-
itor in Chief, Perseus Project, to Denny Chin, Judge, S.D.N.Y. (Aug. 7,
2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/crane.pdf; letter
from Kenneth L. Frazier, Director, General Library System, Univ. of Wis-
consin, to Denny Chin, Judge, S.D.N.Y. (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://
thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/wisconsin.pdf. And for many public-interest
observers of the settlement, its effect on orphan works weighed heavily in
their considerations, tipping some of them into supporting the deal, despite
other misgivings. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Democ-
racy & Technology in Support of Approval of the Settlement & Protection
of Reader Privacy, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2009)
[hereinafter CDT Brief], available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/
cdt amicus.pdf; Letter from Jonathan Band to Denny Chin, Judge,
S.D.N.Y. (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/
ALA%20complete.pdf.
85 Authors Guild, No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 29126 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2011), at *23 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212
(2003)).
86 One amicus brief that focused on the orphan issue ultimately recommended
only that the court proceed with great caution, rather than recommending
approval or rejection on this basis. Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for In-
formation Law and Policy [hereinafter IILP] at 1, 25, Authors Guild, No. 05
Civ. 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://thepublic
index.org/docs/letters/nyls-iilp.pdf.
87 Google Brief in Support, supra note 62, at 5-7.
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gress's explicit directions as reflected in the United States Code. At any
rate, Congress has certainly not forbidden the courts from ever touching
orphan works in any way, shape, or form. Thus, while the settlement's
effects on orphan works are perhaps central to its appeal, they are not -
at least on their own - also central to the legal concerns it raises.
C. Antitrust
The third substantial body of law clearly implicated by the settlement
is antitrust. Both Consumer Purchase and the Institutional Subscription
would have given Google the power to set prices on behalf of a large
group of copyright owners, who normally compete with each other in the
market for readers. Such arrangements raise antitrust eyebrows.88 Con-
sider the two programs in turn.
To sell an individual e-book in Consumer Purchase, Google needs to
set a price. One option under the settlement would have been a Specified
Price, chosen by a copyright owner.89 This approach has to be fine for
antitrust purposes. Half.com is not a cartel even though thousands of sell-
ers all use it to sell their books. But the settlement also would have al-
lowed for a Settlement Controlled Price, set by Google, using an algorithm
it would have developed for this purpose.90 That's "algorithm," singular.
This fact ordinarily rings antitrust alarm bells: the famous Socony-Vacuum
case forbade agreements to use a common "formula" to set prices.91
While the copyright owner could have chosen whether to use the Settle-
ment Controlled Price, 92 it would have been the default, and applied un-
less the copyright owner took action to set a price.93
This sounds damning, save for one very important fact. Google would
have been specifically directed to design an algorithm that will price each
book as though in a competitive market: i.e., to "maximize revenues for
the Rightsholder for such Book and without regard to changes to the price
of any other Book." 94 This is arguably the anti-formula: a price-fixing
scheme designed not to distort the natural workings of the market. 95 If
Google acted in good faith in designing the algorithm, and if the algorithm
88 Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan Works
Monopoly? 15-17 (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 462, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1387582#.
89 See ASA, supra note 3 § 4.2(b)(i)(1).
90 Id. § 4.2(b)(i)(2).
91 United States v. Socony-Vaccum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-23 (1940).
92 See ASA, supra note 3 § 4.2(b)(i)
93 Id. § 4.2(b)(iii).
94 Id. §§ 4.2(b)(i)(2), 4.2(c)(ii)(2).
95 Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive, 2 J. LE-
GAL. ANAL. 1 (2010); Yuan Ji, Why the Google Book Search Settlement
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worked as intended, then Settlement Controlled Pricing could have
avoided the cardinal economic sin of antitrust: collectively raising prices
above the level they would be at under true competition. This is not nec-
essarily an unlikely prospect. Who else would be in a better position to
find smart prices than Google, with its enormous treasure-houses of data?
Of course, the fact that the algorithm might be economically harmless
need not make it legally harmless. Moreover, the algorithm's secrecy raises
its own concerns. What if Google gets the prices wrong? Would Google
be tempted to cheat and raise prices collectively? Would the Registry have
the right incentives to monitor Google's adherence to the settlement?
Would copyright owners have incentives to make the scheme stick if
Google did raise prices? These are legitimate questions about a novel and
untried scheme - but if the only question about the algorithm is whether
it would have worked in practice, then we are not quite in the heartland of
antitrust trouble we seemed to start out in.96
Turning to the Institutional Subscription, the coordination is in a
sense even more explicit than with the individual purchases. Google
would have set a single price that applied to everyone's books.97 Indeed,
the Registry, which would have spoken for all the copyright owners in the
settlement programs, would have explicitly participated in setting that
price.98 Once again, it seems that the settlement would actually have re-
quired coordinated price-fixing by competitors.
Once again, however, things are not quite as they seem. This system
- a single price for a blanket license to a large collection of copyrighted
works - is substantially equivalent to the system used by so-called "per-
formance rights organizations" (PROs) like BMI and ASCAP to sell li-
censes to the public performance rights for musical works. Their
prototypical client is a coffee shop that plays CDs over its speaker system
all day: by purchasing licenses from the PROs, it engages in one-stop shop-
ping to make those hundreds of daily public performances legal.
The PROs have faced antitrust scrutiny - and passed. When BMI
was sued on a theory that its blanket license was a price-fixing scheme, the
Supreme Court heard the case and blessed the arrangement, citing the
efficiencies of one-stop-shopping and the nonexclusively of the relevant
contracts.99 This, of course, is not the end of the matter. Scholars have
challenged the economic reasoning behind the Supreme Court's deci-
Should Be Approved: A Response to Antitrust Concerns and Suggestions for
Regulation, 21 ALB. J. Sci. & TECH. 231 (2011).
96 See generally Elhauge, supra note 95 (extensively discussing incentives under
the settlement and likely outcomes).
97 See ASA, supra note 3 § 4.1(a)(ii).
98 Id.
99 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1979).
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sion.'0 Moreover, the Authors Guild settlement conspicuously lacked a
consent decree comparable to the one under which BMI lives - and the
Supreme Court pointed to the consent decree as one of its reasons for
blessing BMI's programs. 101 One could readily imagine a principled anti-
trust case against the Institutional Subscription that distinguishes BMI or
seeks to overturn it. But that case is tentative and uncertain and depends
on complicated issues in both antitrust economics and antitrust law.
Whatever makes this settlement great or horrifying, it is surely not the
presence or absence of district court review of subscription pricing.
Yet again, the court's actual opinion in Authors Guild steers well clear
of detailed legal analysis on these questions. At three pages of twelve-
point double-spaced Courier, its discussion of antitrust issues is substan-
tially shorter than this Section. 102 It cites a single case and gives almost no
economic analysis. For a third time, the court's opinion suggests dissatis-
faction with the ability of standard doctrinal categories to make sense of
the settlement.
III. THE CLASSCOPYTRUSTLIPHANT
These separate analyses - class actions, copyright, and antitrust -
are all onto something important about the settlement. But on their own,
they seem to raise only incremental concerns. Even when summed, these
three analyses make the settlement seem like no big deal. It happens to be
a controversial, hundred-million-dollar no-big-deal, but the legal questions
seem neither novel nor dramatic.
This impression is an illusion. The settlement was a big deal, and it
raised unprecedented legal questions of fundamental importance. To un-
derstand why, we need to integrate the perspectives of class action, copy-
right, and antitrust law. Putting them together shows how groundbreaking
the proposed settlement really was - and allows us to ask the really hard
questions about it.
A. All of the Above
In a sentence: The settlement used an opt-out class action to bind
copyright owners (including the owners of orphan works) to future uses of
their books by a single defendant.
100 See Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethink-
ing the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMPETITION
LAw & ECON. 541, 571-76 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=547802.
101 Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23-24.
102 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS
29126 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011), at *36-38.
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That was the heart of the settlement. It didn't break down neatly into a
class action issue, a copyright issue, and an antitrust issue. Instead, it raised
a single issue of law and policy, one that touched on all three areas. Class
action law recognizes its trunk; copyright its legs; antitrust its tail. But an
elephant is not a trunk plus legs plus a tail; it is a single animal. So here:
The settlement was a classcopytrustliphant. To see it in all its glory, we
must trace the connections:
1.... The settlement used an opt-out class action to bind copyright
owners. The settlement would have resolved a class action, yes
- but it was a copyright class action. This fact sets up an immedi-
ate tension between the opt-out world of class-actions and the
opt-in world of copyright. It also provides one of the strongest
responses to the "opt-in only" argument against the settlement.
Of course a class action will be in tension with the opt-in logic of
copyright; its whole point is collective adjudication. If it were opt-
in, it wouldn't be a class action. By choosing to allow class ac-
tions, the United States has already made a trans-substantive
choice that opt-in rights, copyright included, must sometimes
yield.
But this point also works in reverse. To the extent that copy-
right is an exclusive opt-in right protected by a property rule, the
law has made a deliberate choice to prize not just the economic
value of the work but also the copyright owner's autonomy to
choose which uses to allow. A class action's opt-out logic under-
mines that choice. This is not to say that class actions cannot deal
in copyrights, only that when they do, the stakes are higher.
2. . . . (including the owners of orphan works ... ). One subclass
of copyright owners is of special importance to the settlement:
orphan owners. On the one hand, they provide the biggest policy
justification for the settlement. The impossibility of obtaining
permissions from un-findable owners would have doomed any
purely voluntary attempt to build a comprehensive index; it is
also responsible for the unavailability of many of these books.
To the extent that the settlement would have "solved" the or-
phan works problem for books, it would have done so because it
imposed an opt-out class action on their owners. The use of a
class action was a game-changer; it broke free of the opt-in logic
that keeps these books out of circulation.
But this fact should also give us pause. Orphan copyright
owners, by definition, cannot be found. If there is one class of
copyright owners we would expect not to opt out of a proposed
settlement or to show up at the fairness hearing, it would be or-
phan owners. As in a Zen koan, the orphan owner whose voice
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can be heard in court is not the true orphan owner. (That is why
several amicus filers recommended that the court appoint sepa-
rate counsel to represent the interests of an orphan "sub-
class."103 ) The opt-out class action would have helped break the
orphan works logjam, but it was also uniquely dangerous pre-
cisely because the case deals with orphan works.
For this reason, the internal opt-outs in the settlement were
almost certainly essential, and so was the Unclaimed Works Fidu-
ciary. The orphan works debate reminds us that many copyright
owners are unlikely to identify themselves any time soon. As of
the opt-out deadline, only about a million books had been
claimed (out of some twelve million scanned). 104 Would the Un-
claimed Works Fiduciary have sufficient powers to protect the
interests of copyright owners who have yet to claim their books?
Would they have sufficient internal opt-out rights to protect their
interests once they do? These questions of class-action fairness
cannot be answered without a close look at the copyright-policy
issues pointed out by the orphan works debate.
3. . . . to future uses of their books ... As discussed above, class
actions that release future claims pose special dangers. Future
copyright claims are particularly interesting, and delicate. In one
sense, a copyright is nothing but an indeterminate set of future
claims. The owner of tangible property almost always has a privi-
lege to use as well as the right to exclude; the owner of a copy-
right has only the right to exclude.105 The real-property future-
use cases transferred only an intangible exclusionary interest,
leaving the owners' substantial privileges to use largely intact.
But to compromise a copyright owner's right to sue is to compro-
mise everything.
The copyright perspective also sheds new light on the ques-
tion of whether the claims released in the settlement stemmed
from the "identical factual predicate" as the original lawsuit. In
one sense, yes, both involved claims of copyright infringement
for Google's use of digitized books. However, there is a world of
103 See Brief of Amicus Curiae IILP, supra note 86.
104 Declaration of Daniel Clancy in Support of Motion for Final Approval of
Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 2010) available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/
amendedsettlement/danclancydeclaration.pdf.
105 In Hohfeldian terminology, a tangible property owner has both privileges (to
use) and claim-rights (to exclude); the owner of a copyright has only claim-
rights. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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difference between the claims the copyright owners could have
asserted against Google (which were subject to a strong, albeit
debatable, fair use defensel0 6 ) and the claims that would have
been released under the settlement (many of which are subject to
no plausible fair use defense and would obviously be infringing if
undertaken without the settlement's protection). By keeping
book sales as future uses, Google avoided numerous copyright
risks associated with those sales - a fact that ought to enter into
the question of whether it is proper for a class action settlement
to authorize such sales. 0 7
4... . by a single defendant. And so we come to the antitrust
angle. In Part II.C, we saw that the antitrust objections to the
settlement were surprisingly indeterminate. The explanation for
this fact is that if there is a compelling antitrust issue here, it has
to do more with the manner of creating these programs than with
the programs themselves. If the Institutional Subscription ap-
peared on our doorstep one day, fully formed, it would be hard
to say we ought to chase it away. Nevertheless, we might have a
very different attitude toward the mad scientists whose unnatural
experiments with class action law created it.
In particular, this was a settlement explicitly structured to be
exclusive. True, it was formally nonexclusive - nothing in it
would have prohibited copyright owners from licensing anyone
else to sell their books.1 08 But in a world with orphan works,
formal nonexclusivity will often be practically worthless. Google
would have had a good-to-go license; its competitors will have no
one to turn to.109 The Department of Justice asked the parties to
consider extending the licenses in the settlement to others; they
declined. 11 0 (One possible reason: providing releases to non-de-
fendant third-parties might cause the settlement to run afoul of
. . . wait for it . . . class action law's limits on released claims.)
Thus: class action law plus a known copyright issue together yield ex-
clusivity, normally antitrust's domain.
106 See, e.g., Sag, supra note 14.
107 James Grimmelmann, When the Unprecedented Becomes Precedent: Class Ac-
tions in a Google Book Search World, Aug. 4, 2009, http://james.grimmel
mann.net/essays/UnprecedentedPrecedent.
108 See James Grimmelmann, The Amended Google Books Settlement Is Still Ex-
clusive, CPI ANTITRUST J. (2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/james-grimmelmann/26.
109 Authors Guild, No 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 29126 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2011), at *36 ("The ASA would give Google a de facto monopoly
over unclaimed works.").
110 See Statement of Interest, supra note 37.
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One counter to this view might be that others wishing to -compete
with Google could obtain similar settlements of their own.'1 1 Whether
this possibility is serious enough to count in the antitrust analysis depends
on both class-action and copyright law. The class action would need to
face the same kinds of justiciability, procedural, and fairness concerns as
the present one (plus the added difficulty of potentially being based on a
collusive lawsuit). Furthermore, whether copyright owners would be in-
terested in negotiating a deal (or should be presumed to be interested by a
court, given copyright's opt-in logic) depends on economic issues at the
intersection of copyright and antitrust law: what are the incentives of sell-
ers in a differentiated market with various intermediary business models?
Such "me-too settlements" are highly unlikely; the procedural bars are se-
rious and the plaintiffs in the present suit would have an incentive to fight
similar settlements for others. 112
Thus, taking the settlement's practical exclusivity as a given, the real
antitrust question becomes whether we should consider it problematic.
This is subtly different from the paradigm case of exclusionary behavior
that raises the entry barriers faced by competitors. Instead, Google would
have been using the legal system to selectively lower entry barriers for
Google and no one else. Randal Picker has analogized the situation to the
acquisition of a government-granted franchise.113 Indeed, this would have
been a very unusual franchise, one granted not by a legislature but by a
court.114
Some commentators have praised the settlement because it would
have raised the availability of books to consumers.11 5 For books that are
out of print, the market would have seen an increase in the number of
111 See David Balto, The Earth Is Not Flat: The Public Interest and the Google
Book Settlement: A Reply to Grimmelmann, American Constitution Society,
http://www.acslaw.org/node/13812 (Jul. 22, 2009, 15:39 EST); but see James
Grimmelmann, The Google Book Search Settlement: Questions Remain,
American Constitution Society, http://www.acslaw.org/node/13837 (July 28,
2009, 14:49 EST).
112 See Grimmelmann, supra note 108.
113 Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Innovation: Framing Baselines in the Google
Book Search Settlement (2009) (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 493), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=1499482.
114 Picker also raised the possibility that the settlement, because it was entered by
a court, could be categorically immune from antitrust scrutiny under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Picker, supra note 88. The parties specifically
waived Noerr-Pennington in Settlement 2.0, but note again the antitrust/
class-action connection. See ASA, supra note 3, attachment M at 7.
115 Letter from Lateef Mtima, Professor of Law and Dir., and Steven D. Jamar,
Professor of Law and Assoc. Dir., Inst. of Intellectual Prop. & Social Jus-
tice, Howard University School of Law, to Denny Chin, Judge, S.D.N.Y
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competitors (one rather than zero), normally a good thing in antitrust law.
Things may look rather different when copyright is part of the picture.
Copyright cares about more than just increasing the supply of books that
already exist; it also cares about authors' incentives to create new books.
The effect of the settlement on future incentives would have depended not
just on what it would have done to the future claims of current book copy-
right owners (a copyright question) but also the extent to which future
creators would have thought themselves sufficiently similarly situated to
the plaintiffs here that a future settlement in another case might affect
them (a class-action question). This "antitrust" question turns out to de-
pend crucially on both copyright and class-action issues.116
B. Concentrated Power
Is the Google Books settlement primarily about class actions, copy-
right, antitrust, or other issues? All of the above. The central truth of the
settlement is that it would have used a class action to gather together scat-
tered copyrights. This concentrating effect touches on deep-seated con-
cerns all across the law. Antitrust law, of course, owes its birth (and its
name) to late nineteenth-century fears of the enormous power of the
"trusts," and continues to scrutinize combinations, agreements, mergers,
market share and other manifestations of concentrated economic
power.117 But it is hardly the only area of law with similar worries.
Class action law frets about protecting large and diffuse classes
against more powerful defendants. To give the class members a fighting
chance in the courtroom, the law lets them join together under the banner
of a single champion: class counsel. But having concentrated so much
power in class counsel's hands, class action law must also protect the class
from its own lawyers.1 8 This tension between safety in numbers and a
single point of failure animates all of class-action law.
Meanwhile, copyright law also struggles with the danger of concen-
trated power. Modern Anglo-American copyright law was born with the
1709 Statute of Anne, a deliberate choice for creative and economic de-
centralization and a rejection of the concentrated power of the Stationers'
(Sept. 7, 2009) [hereinafter IIPSJ Letter] available at http://thepublicindex.
org/docs/letters/Inst IP Social Justice.pdf; see Elhauge supra note 95.
116 But see IIPSJ Letter, supra note 115 (arguing that increased availability of the
works themselves furthers the goals of copyright); see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae IILP supra note 86.
117 See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAw 200 (1996).
118 See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
VA. L. REV. 1051, 1279 (1996).
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Guild. 119 But this decentralization also creates anti-commons problems
(orphan works being only one example), which copyright worldwide often
tries to solve with centralized institutions: registries, compulsory licenses,
and collecting societies.
Indeed, it is noteworthy how many of the other objections to the set-
tlement - not just the Big Three - were driven by this concentration of
power. Take, for example, the fear that Google could choose to censor its
collection of digitized books.120 This fear would have receded if Google
were a small distributor of a few books, competing vigorously with
thousands of others. It is the possibility that Google could have become
the only source for millions of books that gave this concern its urgency.121
The same could be said about privacy: watching how I read one book is
moderately creepy, but watching how I read all my books is profoundly
unnerving.122
Even the dry, detailed questions - such whether 37%/63% was a fair
revenue split or how many class notices were mailed-took on a special
urgency because the class was so large and the settlement so far-reaching
in its effects. One of the most telling filings came from a coalition of visual
artists led by the American Society of Media Photographers, which ob-
jected to the exclusion of pictorial works from the settlement and also to
the settlement's fairness.123 At first, this pair of objections sounds logi-
cally inconsistent: if the settlement was as bad a deal as the photographers
claimed, they should have been happy to be excluded. But their objection
makes more sense if one also accepts their premise that the settlement
would have so profoundly defined the terms on which digitized out-of-
print books would be made available that it would have, as a practical
matter, also defined the deal visual artists would receive when their day
119 See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1968).
120 See, e.g., General Library System letter supra note 84; See also ASA, supra
note 3 § 3.7(e). (explaining that whether those provisions go far enough is,
like so much else with this settlement, controversial).
121 See PATTERSON, supra note 119 (describing a long reflected concern of copy-
right law: the Stationers' Guild was also an instrument of royal press censor-
ship through the "licensing" system, so that eliminating their monopoly
privileges also helped cut printing free of government control); ADRIAN
JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK 230-48 (University of Chicago Press,
1998).
122 See Privacy Authors and Publishers' Objection to Proposed Settlement, The
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,
2009) available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/privacy-authors.pdf;
see also CDT Brief, supra note 69.
123 See Objections of Class Members The American Society of Media Photogra-
phers, Inc., et al., Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
2, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/asmp.pdf.
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came. They understood that the Authors Guild settlement would have all
but preempted the field.
CONCLUSION
A possible response to the orphan works dilemma would be to say
that we really do care about copyrights, even those held by owners who
are hard to find. On this view, orphan owners aren't dead to the world,
only sleeping, and it is our duty to them to safeguard their rights against
the day of their return. If having no sellers of a given work is the price we
must pay for taking copyrights seriously, then so be it: that's what it means
to take rights seriously. If so, then the Authors Guild settlement was obvi-
ously wrongful; it used a class-action shell game to misappropriate copy-
rights away from their rightful owners.
Another possible response would be to say that the costs of trying to
reunite orphan works with their parents far outweigh the social benefits of
doing so. On this view, orphan works - long out of print and producing
no value for owners who will never be found - are casualties of copy-
right's excessively long term. It is our duty to fix copyright law and move
them into the public domain, or at least make them broadly available on
generous and straightforward terms. If the occasional copyright owner
who just nipped down to the corner for a quick pint loses out, then so be it:
that's a small price to pay for a copyright system that works. If so, then
the Authors Guild settlement was troubling because it wrapped books up
in endless, needless layers of red tape, DRM, and legal restrictions.
Both of these views - that there should be no sellers of unclaimed
works and that there should be any number - make simple, intuitive
sense. One need not find them equally convincing to appreciate the phi-
losophies behind them and the intellectual rigor that has gone into articu-
lating them. They correspond, very roughly, to objections that the
settlement went too far or didn't go far enough. At times it has seemed
that the settlement was simply caught between the Scylla of overprotecting
copyrights and the Charybdis of providing too much access, the twin poles
of copyright policy since time immemorial. No compromise, no matter
how elegant, could ever satisfy both camps.
From the perspective of concentrated power, however, the actual pro-
posed Authors Guild settlement, elegant though it was, might actually
have been worse than either extreme. A world with no sellers of orphan
books and a world where anyone can sell them are both still primarily
decentralized. The settlement, however, would have created one seller of
orphan books, pulling together all of the necessary rights into a single
company's hands. This "compromise" between authors' rights and the
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public's access to books just so happened to hand Google a dominant posi-
tion selling older books.124
Ultimately, like every other question of concentrated power in the
information society, the Authors Guild settlement is also a question about
the role of the state. The settlement was a form of collective copyright
management, giving Google the right to sell books unless and until their
copyright owners objected. The class-action settlement would have used
the coercive power of the state to create and enforce its provisions. But
unlike other state-sponsored experiments in information centralization,
which at least were established through democratic processes and subject
to public oversight, the Google-Registry complex would have been the re-
sult of a process instigated by a handful of private parties on terms worked
out in two years of strictly confidential negotiations. Creating an elephant
ex nihilo was a remarkable feat - but the settlement was a wild and dan-
gerous beast.
124 Cf Molly Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law,
96 VA. L. REV. 549, 618-61 (2010) (discussing "consolidating power" of pro-
posed settlement).
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